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Abstract
The article is about the selected and current problems of the Central and Eastern European 
foreign policy of the Slovak Republic. This state, like other small in terms of territory 
Central European countries, due to the actual position held as a player in international 
relations, it cannot influence the decisions of the other states, i.e. more powerful partici-
pants. In this respect, it seems interesting which analysed activities of the Slovak foreign 
policy are now a priority. The content analysis of the source documents and the results of 
operations of the Slovak government allows us to make a distinction between ‘declared 
priorities “and” real priorities”. The first shall be adopted officially, among others, by virtue 
of the Slovak Republic’s membership in the Euro-Atlantic structures, and the latter are 
the result of an independent assessment of international affairs and strive to highlight 
the important role of the Slovak Republic in this area. In the case of the first group of 
priorities a very clear duality of attitudes can also be seen, which makes you think about 
the real objectives, especially in the Eastern European dimension of the foreign policy 
that the current government of the Slovak Republic aims to meet.
Keywords: foreign policy, Slovak Republic, European Union, Ukraine, Russia, Visegrad 
Group, Western Balkans.
Polityka zagraniczna Republiki Słowackiej wobec 
wyzwań w polityce wschodniej Unii Europejskiej
Streszczenie
Artykuł dotyczy wybranych i aktualnych problemów z zakresu środkowo- i wschodnio-
europejskiego wymiaru polityki zagranicznej Republiki Słowackiej. Państwo to, podobnie 
jak inne niewielkie pod względem terytorialnym państwa środkowoeuropejskie, z racji 
rzeczywistej pozycji jaką zajmuje, jako podmiot stosunków międzynarodowych nie ma 
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praktycznych możliwości wpływania na decyzje innych, tj. bardziej znaczących od siebie 
podmiotów. Z racji takiego stanu rzeczy interesującą wydaje się kwestia, które z bada-
nych kierunków aktywności słowackiej polityki zagranicznej mają obecnie znaczenie 
priorytetowe. Analiza treści dokumentów źródłowych oraz efektów działalności słowac-
kiego rządu pozwala na dokonanie podziału na priorytety deklarowane oraz priorytety 
faktyczne. Te pierwsze przyjmowane są oficjalnie, m.in. z racji członkostwa Republiki 
Słowackiej w strukturach euroatlantyckich, te drugie wynikają zaś z samodzielnej oceny 
stanu stosunków międzynarodowych oraz dążenia do zaznaczenia istotnej roli Republiki 
Słowackiej w tej dziedzinie. W wypadku pierwszej grupy priorytetów daje się też zaobser-
wować bardzo wyraźna dwoistość postaw, skłaniająca do refleksji na temat rzeczywistych 
celów, jakie stawia przed sobą, zwłaszcza w zakresie wschodnioeuropejskiego wymiaru 
polityki zagranicznej, obecny rząd Republiki Słowackiej.
Słowa kluczowe: polityka zagraniczna, Republika Słowacka, Unia Europejska, Ukraina, 
Federacja Rosyjska, Grupa Wyszehradzka, Bałkany Zachodnie.
For the first time in the political history of the Slovak Republic, the results of the early 
parliamentary elections held on 10 March 2012, allowed the formation of a single-party 
majority government. Its Prime Minister is Mr Fico1, the leader of the political party 
named “Direction – Social Democracy” (SMER-SD), which thanks to the mentioned 
elections, won 83 seats in the National Council of the Slovak Republic counting 150 
seats. It should legitimately be claimed that a stable parliamentary majority ensured 
then comfortable conditions for the exercise of power to the newly-formed govern-
ment. Assuming that the most important challenges faced by the established on April 4, 
2012 government, included, among others, the problem of the slow pace of economic 
development, which was announced in the election campaign, increasing the welfare 
state and the level of public debt2, we should not forget about the main directions and 
outcomes of the Slovak foreign policy. From this point of view, the Slovak Republic’s 
active role in the European Union’s eastern policy has a greater importance.
On 3 May 2012 the Prime Minister of the government presented to the National 
Council of the Slovak Republic the government’s programme of action for the coming 
1 R. Fico became the Prime Minister of the Slovak government for the first time on 4 July 2006. 
Since that day till 8 July 2010 a majority government coalition was formed by the SMER-SD, the Slovak 
National Party (SNS) and the People’s Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (LS-HZDS). More on 
this topic: B. Pytlik, Parliament and the government in the Slovak Republic, Warszawa 2013, pp. 128 et seq.
2 More on this topic: B. Pytlik, Public debt in selected countries of Central Europe in crisis conditions, 
in modern state and public debt. Dilemmas and myths, ed. I. Zawiślińska, Warsaw 2014, pp. 151–155 
and 162–168.
3 See: Programování vyhlásenie Vlady Parlamentná tlač republiky č. 37 or http://www.vlada.gov.
sk/data/files/2008_programove-vyhlasenie-vlady.pdf, access 6.05.2015.
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four years. In the second part of the so-called programme declaration, entitled 
“Strengthening the status of the Slovak Republic in the European Union and in the 
world”, R. Fico stressed the importance of the membership in the Euro-Atlantic struc-
tures to ensure safety in the political, economic and social dimension. He declared 
“specific support and active participation in the common foreign and security policy, 
and thus also in the process of extending the zone of democracy stability and coopera-
tion, including the Western Balkans and the Eastern Partnership. What is important, 
good relations with the latter countries have been recognized as vital to the interests 
of the Slovak Republic. Considering the issue of regional cooperation and bilateral 
relations, the need for active participation in activities within the Visegrad Group 
and to maintain good neighbourly relations with the Czech Republic, the Republic 
of Poland, Hungary, the Republic of Austria and Ukraine was also stressed. Having 
in mind the other states, R. Fico emphasized that the relations of the Slovak Republic 
with the Russian Federation and other countries of the BRICS group would be sig-
nificant. Raising the issue of strengthening security of the state, the Prime Minister 
of the government assured the readiness to take active measures to keep peace and 
stability in Europe and around the world. Comparing the mentioned programme 
declaration in its entirety with the presented in the past programmes, i.e. since the 
establishment of the Slovak Republic on 1 January 1993, it should be emphasized 
that it was characterized by exceptional vagueness, as indeed was the main objection 
raised during the parliamentary debate by the opposition MPs. Secondly, it was dif-
ficult then to admit that the current issues of the foreign policy were to be problems 
for the government under the leadership of R. Fico, which he would like to dedicate 
his attention in the first place in the spring of 2012. As such urgent problems should 
be considered the main issues that make up the content of the economic programme, 
which inter alia persuaded to SMER-SD such a large number of voters while in the 
opinion of the opposition deserved only to be called populist.
The Slovak foreign policy towards the events in Ukraine 
and the Russian Federation
The consequences of the events that took place after the association agreement 
between Ukraine and the European Union was not signed in November 2013, forced 
the Slovak government to determine exactly some of the objectives of the foreign 
policy. The incorporation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea by the Russian 
Federation and the conflict in eastern Ukraine were officially recognized as one of 
the most important events that „have made the foreign policy of the Slovak Republic 
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face new challenges, which in the last twenty years it has not been forced to face”. 
Violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a neighbouring state, in the 
opinion of the Slovak government, “disturbed the European geopolitical balance 
and the principles of international law as well as hindered the Ukrainian authori-
ties from controlling the entire territory. The situation, therefore, requires special 
attention to security issues. Hence, the Slovak Republic in the coming period must 
be ready to respond to changes that may occur in Europe, including those caused 
by the crisis in Ukraine”3.
Basing on the information contained in the source documents, an interesting and 
quite far-reaching true statement should be stressed that the events that took place 
in Ukraine, contributed in the opinion of the government to break, already existing 
for a long time between the main parties and political movements, consensus on 
the foreign policy objectives. However, regardless of the disclosed differences, the 
Slovak government has decided to continue to call for respect for the principles of 
international law and support peaceful efforts to resolve the crisis, while preserving 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine.
Presenting a quite generally outlined stance of the government of the Slovak Re-
public on the situation in Ukraine, it is impossible not to notice the official attitude 
of the authorities to the activities undertaken by the European Union towards the 
Russian Federation. Thus, the placed restrictions were seen as tools, not the EU’s 
policy objectives. In the event of a trend leading to the adoption of a commonly 
acceptable solution to the crisis, the Slovak authorities have declared their readi-
ness to gradually withdraw from the imposed sanctions. Slovakia also stressed the 
need to conduct a political dialogue with the authorities of the Russian Federation 
in order to jointly find a way out of the situation. Moreover, the Slovak government 
has proposed to strengthen the position of the OSCE, whose actions can play a very 
important role in the conflict resolution, de-escalation of political tensions and the 
creation of a special observation mission in Ukraine4.
Before mentioning the actions actually carried out by the Slovak government 
in connection with the situation in Ukraine, it should be acknowledged that the au-
thorities of the Slovak Republic since the date of its creation (especially in 1993–1998 
and 2006–2010) have been in favour of maintaining the best possible relations with 
the Russian Federation5. It should be emphasised at this point that the pro-Russian 
3 See: Zameranie zahraničnej and Európskej politiky republiky 2015, p. 2, https://www.mzv.sk/sk/ 
zahranicna__politika/dokumenty_k_zahranicnej_politike, – access 6.05.2015.
4 Ibidem, p. 4.
5 More on this topic inter alia: R. Moose, Slovak Foreign Policy, Łódź 2007; B. Pytlik, Foreign Policy 
of the Slovak Republic in 1993–1998, in public administration. Between politics, law and economics, ed. 
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sympathies are characteristic not only for a part of the Slovak political elites – i.e. the 
views of nationalists, Christian democrats and social democrats or socialists – but also 
for a large part of Slovak society. This state of affairs is deeply rooted in the history 
and its genesis is closely associated with the nineteenth-century idea of  Panslavism, 
which Slovaks pinned their hopes on to gain independence in the past. According 
to A. Dulęba, chairing the think tank called SFPA (Slovak Foreign Policy Associa-
tion), which deals with the issues of the foreign policy, Slovaks created themselves 
the myth of Russia, which they would like to see. This vision lasted another century. 
“This positive image was reinforced by the Red Army, which in 1944 supported the 
Slovak national uprising. Even the occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 meant 
a kind of tribute to the Slovaks, because only then a model of federation was accepted, 
in which the Slovaks and Czechs have become politically equal partners (...)”6. What 
is important, the pro-Russian sympathies are accompanied by quite common among 
Slovaks anti-Ukrainian stereotypes. According to them, the Ukrainians since the first 
half of the 90 s have been still associated primarily with conducting an organized 
criminal activity. But we must not forget that not all Slovaks should be identified with 
the presented views. Mostly well-educated residents of large cities, being to a large 
extent the electorate of political parties and movements, which in 1998–2006 and 
2010–2012 formed pro-reform government coalitions7, should be included to a pro-
Ukrainian and sceptical towards the policy of the Russian authorities group. It is worth 
mentioning that the undoubted success of two governments, chaired by M. Dzurinda, 
was among others obtaining membership in the European Union and NATO by the 
Slovak Republic. Currently the incumbent President of the Slovak Republic, A. Kiska, 
follows consistently a pro-Ukrainian policy which is relevant to the current political 
situation and the actual relations between the entities of the executive.
Apart from the contents of official declarations presented by the government 
of the Slovak Republic, it must be stressed that the foreign policy of this country 
towards the conflict in eastern Ukraine and thus towards the Russian Federation is 
characterized by a peculiar duality of attitudes. Whenever the members of the Euro-
pean Union made a decision to impose or tighten the sanctions against the Russian 
Federation, the Slovak authorities always supported these decisions eventually. As it 
turns out, this policy did not constitute the slightest obstacle to the Prime Minister 
of the government and other politicians of SMER-SD, to criticize at every possible 
opportunity the sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation by the European Union. 
J. Osiński, Warsaw 2009, pp. 227–261.
6 See: http://m.wyborcza.pl/wyborcza/1,105405,17842435, Adam_Michnik_poleca__Jak_poko-
chac_stacje_benzynowa.html, access 6.05.2015.
7 See: B. Pytlik, Parliament and the government..., op.cit., pp. 105–141.
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Maintaining the existing and imposing new sanctions is seen as a potential source of 
tension escalation, which ultimately may make finding the effective solutions through 
diplomatic efforts difficult. What is important, in the opinion of R. Fico, the current 
authorities of that country which “cannot control it and organize its internal affairs” 
as well as the US authorities that have deliberately led to the “geopolitical conflict 
between them and Russia”8 are the culprits of the conflict in eastern Ukraine.
R. Fico and the Foreign Minister, M. Lajčák, go to extraordinary lengths not to make 
the policy the Slovak government pursues towards the crisis in Ukraine be seen as 
only pro-Russian. As the main argument in this regard is the aid that the Slovak 
government is to provide Ukraine by giving the so-called small reverse of natural 
gas supplied by the pipeline “Vojany-Uzhgorod”. This aid, which would not have 
occurred if not for the European Commission’s procedures, it should be stressed 
that the Slovak government has consistently failed to agree on the launch of the so-
called large reverse, by the main gas bus, i.e. the “Brotherhood” pipeline which is 
quite in line with the expectations of the authorities of the Russian Federation and 
matches the mentioned duality of attitudes.
The Slovak government conciliatory attitude towards the activities carried out by 
the authorities of the Russian Federation does not stem from historical events and the 
pro-Russian sympathies of the governing politicians or the fact that the ruling party is 
of the left-wing provenance. It should be acknowledged that the dual and conflicting 
actions characteristic for the Slovak foreign policy towards Ukraine, are primarily 
aimed at promoting its own interests. Criticism and the government’s distancing 
from the views of the President, A. Kiski, who is an advocate of tightening sanctions 
against the Russian Federation, the failure of the Slovak parliament to approve the 
resolution calling on the Russian authorities to stop supporting separatists in the 
Donbas and start respecting the territorial integrity of Ukraine, for now on bring 
real benefits. The Slovak Republic, whose economy is dependent on the supplies of 
Russian oil and natural gas, can rely on the cheapest supplies of both raw materials 
from all European Union members. In addition, it also benefits financially from the 
reverse of natural gas to Ukraine.
This way of implementing the presented Slovak foreign policy may also have an 
important political significance internally. It is impossible not to notice that as a result 
of successive economic scandals, the political position of R. Fico and SMER-SD9 
ruling party is currently weakening. As a result, in the coming parliamentary term 
8 Cf. Visegrad cacophony against Russian-Ukrainian conflict,http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/ana-
lizy/2014–09–10/wyszehradzka-kakofonia-wobec-konfliktu-rosyjsko-ukrainskiego, access 5.07.2015.
9 J. Groszkowski, Slovakia: the position of Prime Minister, Fico, is weakening, http://www.osw.waw.
pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2015–04–29/slowacja-slabnie-pozycja-premiera-ficy, access 5.07.2015.
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they may lose not only the ability to govern on their own, but also it will signifi-
cantly reduce their chances of SMER-SD coalition. Having in mind the planned for 
the spring of 2016 parliamentary elections, it can be assumed that the pro-Russian 
strategy, consistently implemented by the Prime Minister and the other members 
of the government is to lead primarily to maintain the support of their electorate. 
According to the research conducted by SFPA in 2014, these voters can mostly be 
seen in the groups such as: 33% of respondents who disagree that the authorities of 
the Slovak Republic support Ukraine’s aspirations for integration with the European 
Union (22% undecided); 54% claiming that the Slovak-Russian relations should not be 
antagonized (22% undecided); 49% opting for maintaining active relations with the 
authorities of the Russian Federation (28% undecided); 49% of opponents of the use 
of sanctions against the Russian Federation (23% undecided) and 71% of those who 
would reduce the level of dependence on supplies of natural gas and crude oil from 
the Russian Federation (12% undecided) 10.
Taking into account the latest of the mentioned issues, as well as the fact that the 
role of the Slovak Republic as a transit country will be reduced if the planned gas 
pipeline “Turkish Stream” is launched, the Slovak government is taking significant 
measures to maintain their current position and at the same time to reduce its en-
ergy dependence from the Russian Federation. The construction of “Eastring” gas 
pipeline and new connections with the Republic of Poland and Hungary, as well as 
the intensified cooperation with the Republic of Austria, which is to encourage the 
accession of the Slovak Republic in January 2015 to the so-called Slavkov Triangle, will 
contribute to meet these objectives. It is difficult to acknowledge that the mentioned 
actions of the Slovak government were directly connected with the current situation 
in Ukraine, but it is certain that the circumstances created favourable conditions for 
the acceleration of diversification work.
Basing on the analysis of the current actions, it should be assumed that in the 
near future we will not witness a radical change of the Slovak foreign policy towards 
Ukraine, and especially towards the Russian Federation. Thus, criticism of the sanc-
tions will go together with the objection to launch natural gas supplies to Ukraine11 
by “Brotherhood” pipeline as well as with the lack of protests against the potential 
actions of the European Union aimed at resolving the Ukrainian crisis.
10 See: A. Dulęba, RCE towards Ukrajine ako Impulz pre východnú SR politiku and EÚ. Analýza postojov 
slovenskej verejnosti and odporúčania pre zahraničnú politiku SR, Bratislava 2014, pp. 11–14.
11 They result from the work undertaken after the so-called the Russian-Ukrainian gas conflict in 2009.
126 Bogusław Pytlik
Studia z Polityki Publicznej
The activity of the Slovak Republic within  
the Visegrad Group
Focusing on the regional dimension of the Slovak foreign policy pursued together 
with some neighbouring countries, it should be first emphasised that since 1 July 
2014 until 30 June 2015 the Slovak Republic has held the presidency of the Visegrad 
Group. In connection with this event the government under the leadership of R. Fico 
set the objectives which were presented in the document “Programme of the Slovak 
Republic Presidency of the Visegrad Group, July 2014 – June 2015. Dynamic Visegrád 
for Europe and the world”12.
The analysis of the content of the programme shows that the major challenges have 
been determined such as ensuring energy security – for this propose the establish-
ment of a common market of natural gas and the construction of regional connec-
tions and pumping stations are suggested; development of transport infrastructure; 
cooperation in the field of defence – including in particular the creation of a so-called 
Visegrad Battle Group, which is expected to reach full capacity of fighting in the first 
half of 2016; continued efforts to identify the policy priorities of innovation and the 
further development of cooperation. Another key goal which will be realized in the 
second half of the Slovak presidency, is the development of so-called V4 + format, 
i.e. development of a dialogue between Visegrad Group countries and external part-
ners, in particular the Federal Republic of Germany, the UK, the Benelux countries, 
Scandinavia, the Baltic states and Eastern Partnership as well as South Korea and the 
United States. From the point of view of the official policy of the Slovak government, 
the effective coordination of the positions of the Visegrad Group states at a European 
level and the efforts to introduce new areas of cooperation, among others, in terms 
of competitiveness of enterprises, public finance, research and innovation13.
The Slovak Republic is in favour of conducting joint operations with other coun-
tries of the Visegrad Group to support the modernization of socio-economic and 
political Ukraine, as well as assisting Georgia and the Republic of Moldova in their 
efforts to be associated with the European Union. Those activities that will contribute 
to the strengthening of pro-European political elites of the countries being Eastern 
partners of the Slovak Republic are regarded as extremely important. The transfer of 
the experience gained in the transition period, the implementation of Association 
12 The programme was adopted by the government of the Slovak Republic by the resolution of 
4 June 2014.
13 See: Program Slovenského predsedníctva vo Vyšehradská skupine jul 2014 – jun 2015 Dynamický 
Vyšehrad pre europium and svet, Bratislava 2014, pp. 11–23.
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Agreements, developing relevant institutions or adapting national law to the EU law 
will help to achieve this goal. Efforts to support other countries aspiring to membership 
in the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty, and in particular promoting 
the policy of “NATO open-door” are also crucial. The Slovak Republic on behalf of 
all member states of the Visegrad Group stands ready to share experience with the 
countries concerned with implementing the various sectoral policies for integration 
with the Euro-Atlantic structures. It is worth mentioning that from the perspective 
of the foreign policy of the Slovak government, the Visegrad Group countries should 
primarily promote integration aspirations of Western Balkan countries14.
Past results of the Slovak Republic Presidency of the Visegrad Group only slightly 
correspond to the presented, ambitious targets. Observing the activity of the foreign 
minister and other members of the Slovak government, it can be reasonably con-
cluded that it is rather unlikely that by the end of June 2015 this situation could be 
improved. Also in terms of the current challenges of the European Union’s eastern 
policy, the effects of the Slovak presidency can hardly be considered as sufficiently 
strengthening the unity of the Central European countries. First of all, we should 
realise that numerous declarations do not go together with numerous joint ventures 
what in a way is quite characteristic of the Visegrad Group. Creating a common 
market for natural gas or launching the Visegrad Battle Group15 are initiatives already 
undertaken during the Polish Presidency, which took place since 1 July 2012 until 30 
June 2013. It should be added that in that period not only a proposal appeared, but 
there was the first meeting of foreign ministers of the countries such as the Visegrad 
Group, the Nordic and Baltic states, on the economic and political problems16.
In the framework of the Slovak Presidency, i.e. since July 2014 several meetings 
have been held (often at the level of deputy ministers) of a thematic or informa-
tion nature. On behalf of the Visegrad 9 official statements were issued until 13 
March 2015. Considering the activity connected with the planned development of 
the so-called V4 + format, the meeting of foreign ministers of the Visegrad Group 
and South Korea (17 July 2014) should be mentioned. Another important meeting 
was attended by the Prime Ministers of the governments of the mentioned states of 
Central Europe and the President of the Swiss Confederation (9 November 2014)17. 
In connection with the events taking place in Ukraine, the foreign ministers of the 
14 Ibidem, pp. 28–30.
15 The agreement on the formation of the Visegrad Battle Group was signed during the Polish Pre-
sidency, on 14 March 2014 by the defense ministers of the Visegrad Group.
16 See: The report of the Polish presidency in the Visegrad Group, July 2012 – June 2013, Warsaw 
2013, p. 28.
17 During the meeting of prime ministers of governments, the declaration on deepening defense 
cooperation of the Visegrad Group was adopted.
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Visegrad Group countries appreciatively accepted the results of the Ukrainian par-
liamentary elections held on 26 October 2014, and soon after the elections, i.e. on 
November 16, 2014, after a meeting with Foreign Minister of Ukraine, they called 
for the unconditional implementation of the provisions contained in the minutes of 
the armistice, signed on 4 September 2014 in Minsk. During the Slovak Presidency 
meetings on the development of cooperation with the countries of the Western Balkans 
(31 October 2014) as well as with the foreign ministers of the Nordic countries and 
the Baltic States (12–13 March 2015) were continued. The initiative, taken by the State 
currently holding the presidency of the Visegrad Group, to extend the cooperation 
in the framework of the “V4 +” to China is also worth mentioning and gives a plus 
to its initiator. According to the statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the Slovak Republic on 19 May 2015, the cooperation is to include political con-
sultations and joint actions, among others, in the fields of innovation and research 
as well as to be part of a programme of strategic partnership called “European Union 
– People’s Republic of China”.
It might be reasonably assumed that the current activity of the Slovak Republic 
within the Visegrad Group should be assessed on the basis of the already achieved 
results, or even through the prism of the proposed new initiatives. As it has already 
been suggested, such a viewpoint would not certainly be sufficient for making a posi-
tive assessment of the Slovak Presidency. On the other hand, it should be remembered 
that such a “quantitative” approach to this issue is absolutely unjustified. The major 
problem in this area is, in fact, more fundamental and not about the activities of the 
individual states but it comes down to the question whether all countries of the Viseg-
rad Group, apart from jointly signing political declarations, are also able to operate 
effectively? Regarding the former, it should be stressed that the submission of joint 
declarations for the representatives of the governments of the Visegrad Group has 
never been a problem. However, the problem of quality of the joint activities looks 
completely different. In the opinion of numerous observers of political life in Central 
Europe, the minimum current effectiveness of the Visegrad Group, as a kind of foreign 
policy tool, is due to the lack of unity among the “Visegrad countries”. At present, an 
invariably critical attitude of the Polish authorities to the policy pursued by the Russian 
authorities towards Ukraine and the lack of understanding for the behaviour of the 
pro-Russian authorities of the other Visegrad Group countries, largely dependent on 
energy supplies from the Russian Federation, are primarily considered as its causes.
Although the problem of the effectiveness of joint actions of the Visegrad Group 
is not the principal focus of this study, however, it is impossible not to emphasize 
that differences of “Visegrad countries” interests which have been observed almost 
since the dawn of this initiative. Hence, the fact of their occurrence is not the result 
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of intentional, disintegration actions of the authorities of other countries, which for 
example Western European journalists sometimes suggest. Focusing only on the 
period after 1 May 2004, when the Visegrad Group countries met their primary aim 
of integrating with the Euro-Atlantic structures, it needs to be recalled that they 
had competed several times with each other for foreign direct investment, instead 
of undertaking cooperation in this regard. In the past, the differences in the views 
were also visible and they concerned: the functioning of the European Union or the 
EU budget perspective for 2014–2020, the deployment on the Polish and the Czech 
Republic territory the parts of the so-called missile shield or recognition of the inde-
pendence of the Republic of Kosovo. What is very significant is the fact that Visegrad 
Group countries have never developed a long-term strategy for regional development, 
the implementation of which would be independent of the political situation. They 
have also never taken an attempt to analyse the potential need to support regional 
cooperation by a legislative dimension.
To sum up, it can be concluded that it is justifiable to claim that the appearance 
of the next significant differences of interests – which seems inevitable, because it 
is impossible to find out the reasons why the “Visegrad countries” should not seek 
to increase their own benefits – may lead to decision-making by a smaller number 
of countries or to creation of alternative forms of regional cooperation, as exempli-
fied by the initiative, which results in the “Declaration of Sławkowska” from January 
2015. You can also assume that the interests of the Visegrad Group countries will be 
more contradictory to the aspirations of the other countries, thus all the questions 
about the actual need for the continued existence of the Central European Initiative, 
whose not only political, but also social role is very far from success, will be legitimate.
Western Balkan countries in the Slovak foreign policy
Practically since the very beginning Western Balkans region has been very 
important for the European Union. Undoubtedly, the organization’s commitment 
to addressing the next local crises, and to the process of rebuilding and stabilizing the 
situation in the region proves that statement. Drawing up the major parts of the EU 
strategy for the Western Balkan countries in 1999, included in the framework of the 
Stabilisation and Association Process (Stabilisation and Association Process – SAP), 
created a chance to make the countries in the region join the European Union, which 
was officially confirmed on 19 and 20 June 2000 at the European Council summit 
in Santa Maria de Feira and in the conclusions of the EU – Western Balkans summit, 
held on 21 June 2003 in Thessaloniki.
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It is acknowledged that among the member states of the European Union there 
is officially a consensus about regarding its expansion policy as the most important 
factor stabilizing the political situation in the Western Balkans. We cannot forget 
that due to “different geographical, political, economic and historical conditions, 
the views of the member states on the European perspective of the Balkan countries 
are somewhat diverse”. This fact has a significant impact on the pace of the accession 
process. The European Union countries neighbouring the Western Balkan countries 
such as the Republic of Slovenia, Hungary, Romania, the Republic of Bulgaria, the 
Greek Republic, and even the Italian Republic because of its geographical location 
and business relations with neighbouring countries strive for the soonest possible 
integration of the countries of the mentioned region with the European Union18. 
What is important is the fact that this issue has been given top priority in the foreign 
policy of the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic19. Therefore, both states shall 
endeavour, if possible especially financially, to clearly mark their presence in the region 
and their role in the integration of the Western Balkan countries with the European 
Union. It should also be emphasized that in accordance with the official stance of the 
Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “expanding the Euro-Atlantic structures by the 
Western Balkan countries helps to improve the stability, democracy and development 
of not only the region but also the entire European continent”20.
Taking into account primarily the effects of actions undertaken and implemented 
in recent years on behalf of the government by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Slovak Republic, it should be stressed that getting membership in the European Union 
by the Republic of Croatia in 2013 was seen as a success and the participation of the 
Slovak Republic as significant. The personal commitment of successive ministers of 
foreign affairs (especially of the last two, i.e. M. Dzurinda and M. Lajčák), so as soon 
as possible to start and support the representatives of the Republic of Croatia during 
the final stages of the accession process21 as well as the fact that the Slovak Republic 
was the first among the EU member states to ratify the accession treaty being the basis 
of accession of the Republic of Croatia to the European Union22, are highlighted here.
18 Cf. J. Muś, The Western Balkans in the European Union policy and Member States, in: The Western 
Balkans and European integration. Prospects and Implications, ed. R. Sadowski, J. Muś, Warsaw 2008, p. 17.
19 See: J. Lörincz, Zapadny Balkán – úspechy and stagnácia, “Yearbook of Foreign Policy of the Slovak 
Republic” 2011, no. 1, p. 135.
20 See e.g. Správa of plnenie úloh zahraničnej and Európskej politiky republiky v 2014, p. 15, https://www.
mzv.sk/App/wcm/media.nsf/vw_ByID/ID_CB51EF39413099BEC1257E1B00367F29_SK/$File/150402_
sprava_ZP_2014.pdf, access 5.10.2015.
21 J. Lörincz, Zapadny Balkán – pokrok and stagnácia, in: Ročenka zahraničnej poltiky Slovenskej 
Republiky 2012, Bratislava 2013, p. 119.
22 The event took place on 17 February 2012.
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The analysis of the content of the source documents provided by the Slovak Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs23 shows that a wide ranging assistance provided by the Slovak 
government was important for starting negotiations and later signing the stabilisation 
and association agreement by the European Union and the Republic of Montenegro, 
and later by the Republic of Serbia as well as for starting the accession negotiations 
with these countries (Republic of Montenegro since June 2012, Republic of Serbia 
since January 2014). In the case of both countries, the Slovak Republic played an 
active role to help them obtain the status of candidate countries, and now the Slo-
vak diplomats are trying to have a stimulating influence on accelerating the pace of 
negotiations conducted by the representatives of the Republic of Montenegro and 
are of the opinion that the authorities of the Republic of Serbia are ready to open the 
first chapters in the accession negotiations. With regard to that country, the Slovak 
authorities stress that they are actively involved to support reforms and integration 
by implementing measures to strengthen the institution of “rule of law” and stream-
line the process of informing the public about certain aspects of membership in the 
Euro-Atlantic structures. In the context of efforts to further develop cooperation 
between NATO and the Balkan states the fact that the embassy of the Slovak Republic 
in Belgrade between 2015 and 2016 will serve as the so-called a contact embassy of 
the North Atlantic Treaty is stressed.
The next major challenge in western Balkan aspect of the Slovak foreign policy 
is to provide assistance to the authorities of the Republic of Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and the Republic of Macedonia in the activities of a reformist nature 
which lead to the development of good neighbourly relations and ultimately to achieve 
membership of the European Union. It is worth mentioning that the Republic of 
Albania since June 2014 has had the status of an official candidate to join the Eu-
ropean Union. This fact has met with full approval from the Slovak government, 
highlighting the progress made by the Albanian authorities, especially in the fight 
against corruption and organized crime. Bosnia and Herzegovina still expect to be 
granted a candidate status, which will be possible after a positive assessment of its 
internal stability and the progress of reform efforts. For this reason, the representatives 
of the Slovak government publicly emphasize the need for an effective mechanism 
to coordinate functioning of all institutions responsible for reforms of the socio-
economic development. It should be stressed that the current Foreign Minister, 
M. Lajčák, in 2007–2009 held the position of a High Representative for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The Republic of Macedonia has been an official candidate since 2004. 
23 See: https://www.mzv.sk/sk/zahranicna__politika/dokumenty_k_zahranicnej_politike, access 
5.10.2015.
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However, the severity of internal reforms, and above all still continuing dispute 
with the Republic of Greece on the name of the Macedonian state24 prevent further 
progress of integration. Not without significance in this regard are also territorial 
claims put forward by the Greek Republic and the Republic of Bulgaria. It should 
also be pointed out that the government of the Slovak Republic is active in favour of 
intensifying Slovak-Macedonian economic cooperation.
The problem of the Republic of Kosovo should be acknowledged as a separate, 
yet very important issue for western Balkan aspect of the Slovak foreign policy. This 
state has not been recognized by the Slovak Republic as independent25 since the an-
nouncement of its independence to this day. However, this fact does not mean that 
the Republic of Kosovo is not in the range of interests of the Slovak foreign policy. The 
creation of appropriate conditions for establishing a dialogue leading to an agreement 
between the authorities of the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Kosovo is the 
main goal set by the Slovak diplomats. At the same time, the main activity of the last 
two Slovakian foreign ministers in this matter was limited primarily to making Serbian 
authorities more active in order to find solutions more intensively to improve the exist-
ing situation. From the point of view of the foreign policy of the Slovak government, 
much more important than the official recognition of the Republic of Kosovo by the 
Serbian authorities are the efforts to improve regional cooperation, which de facto 
means accepting the existence of the Republic of Kosovo by the Serbian authorities and 
establishing cooperation with the authorities, even if this is only because of concern 
for the interests of the Serb minority, and above all to care about the security of the 
Western Balkans. The firm position of the Slovak government to refuse to recognize 
the Republic of Kosovo is another issue highlighting the difference in the views of 
the current Prime Minister of the government, R. Fico and the President, A. Kiska.
Because of the international activity of the Slovak government the activity not only 
for the “expansion of the European Union”, but the so-called policy of NATO’s open 
door is crucial. In both cases, the actions taken were focused on assisting the countries 
aspiring to participate in the Euro-Atlantic by meeting the membership criteria. At 
this point it is worth mentioning the significant initiative of the Slovak Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, thanks to which in 2011 the institution called the “Centre for Ex-
perience Transfer of Integration and Reforms” was founded and was integrally con-
nected with the programme of ODA (Official Development Assistance – ODA). The 
actions taken by the Centre are to promote the development and sharing experience 
24 It is officially the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
25 The independence of the Republic of Kosovo is not also approved by other European Union 
 countries, i.e. the Republic of Cyprus, the Hellenic Republic, Romania and the Kingdom of Spain.
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gained in the process of political and economic transition with the authorities of the 
Western Balkans and the Eastern Partnership. In particular, the activity of Slovak 
experts representing the government, NGOs and businesses aims to provide finan-
cial26 and substantive support in the following areas: reforms and public finance 
management, security (including energy and food), support of the development of 
small and medium-sized enterprises, environmental protection natural, reforms and 
decentralization of public administration and civil society development, as well as 
to improve cooperation between governmental and nongovernmental organizations27.
Moreover, other actions with a different scope of help were initiated by the Slovak 
government, for example Judicial Academy of the Slovak Republic, organizing expert 
meetings with the representatives of the Ministries of Justice of the Western Balkan 
countries on the exchange of experiences in the field of rule of law, should also be 
mentioned. In addition, in Bratislava meetings of foreign ministers of the Visegrad 
Group countries with their Western Balkan counterparts are regularly held. The fact 
of establishing the Western Balkans Fund, modelled on Visegrad Fund, is the effect 
of the efficient operation of the Slovak Republic and the other “Visegrad” states.
***
Knowing the reality of international political relations and the analysis of actions 
taken and implemented in the field of foreign policy by the Slovak government may 
lead to a reasonable conclusion that a real possibility of the Slovak Republic to in-
fluence the others’ decisions, especially of those more powerful states, subjects of 
international relations in key areas, are very clearly limited. The natural consequence 
of the adoption of this perspective should be narrowing of the actual state activity 
in international politics only to a few priorities. The question should be, therefore, 
raised: which of the directions of the Slovak Republic activity in the field of foreign 
policy can be considered as those with greater importance?
Certainly, the actions taken towards Ukraine are not essential. You can also un-
derstand the issue differently, stating that the importance of Ukraine in the Slovak 
foreign policy is only connected with the official statements. We cannot forget that this 
state of affairs was not fixed in the past. Especially after the events that were known 
in history as the “Orange Revolution”. For Ukrainian reformers changes that occurred 
in the Slovak Republic after 1998, were an excellent model to follow. In 2005–2006 
26 Financial aid includes inter alia supporting projects to provide a financial contribution for the so-
-called microgrants, funding for study visits, technical assistance, scholarships and supporting volunteers.
27 SVN. Centrum na odovzdávanie skúseností z integrácie and a reforiem, eng. Centre for Experience 
Transfer from Integration and Reforms – CETIR. See: http://slovakaid.sk/sk/ako-pomahame/cetir, access 
10.05.2015.
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Slovak-Ukrainian relations became much more intense, and the primary objective 
of numerous meetings and work of, among others, departmental working groups 
was to transfer the Slovak experience gained in the period of the pro-reform govern-
ments, chaired by M. Dzurinda. Increased cooperation between the two countries 
ended after parliamentary elections in the Slovak Republic on 17 June 2006. As 
a result of the elections a national-populist government coalition was formed by the 
SMER-SD, the People’s Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (LS-HZDS) and 
the Slovak National Party (SNS). With the rise of the new Slovak government again 
a pro-Russian dimension of Slovak foreign policy became more significant. The fact 
that in Ukraine as early as in 2006 the issue of reforming the state has become far less 
important than the political conflicts between W. Yanukovych, Prime Minister Yulia 
Tymoshenko and President V. Yushchenko should be also acknowledged.
Considering the current situation in Ukraine, it is obvious that all the mainstream 
ideas and initiatives on how to resolve the current problems are primarily the most 
important actors in international relations. The government of the Slovak Republic 
does not have any influence on them, although some of these decisions could show 
to coincide with the current assumptions and orientations of the Slovak foreign 
policy. The appropriate example could be the decisions which were presented on 
21 and 22 May 2015 during the Eastern Partnership Summit in Riga, and which were 
often only about the declaration of the “recognition of the European aspirations” and 
“respect for the European choice” e.g. Ukraine.
The foreign policy of the Slovak Republic (as well as the Czech Republic and 
Hungary) towards the events in Ukraine, especially towards the Russian Federation 
can have a significant impact, among others, on the quality of further cooperation of 
the Visegrad Group. A different way of looking at the potential threat to Central Eu-
rope which could be the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, and for this reason, the different 
expectations of cooperation with NATO can significantly hinder further cooperation. 
Ambiguous or different evaluation of the actions of the authorities of the Russian 
Federation represented by, among others, Slovak government may be used by the 
Russian authorities as confirmation of the lack of unity among the countries of the 
European Union and NATO. Regardless of further developments in Ukraine-Russia 
relations it should be stressed that constantly visible and significant differences of 
interests of “Visegrad countries” are a very obvious reason why the Slovak govern-
ment cannot, and above all, do not intend to see this activity under this initiative as 
a priority of its foreign policy.
The problem of Western Balkan countries looks completely different. Considering 
all mentioned in this report areas of activity of the Slovak government in the field of 
foreign policy, it can be reasonably concluded that its involvement in the Western 
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Balkans is the most commendable. The Slovak international forum activity certainly 
can contribute to the perception of the state as one of the most important and active 
advocates of integration of the Western Balkan countries with the European Union 
and NATO. In addition to the already recorded successes, the Slovak Republic has its 
own tangible contribution i.e., among others, the progress, although slow, in improving 
Serbian-Kosovan relations in 2015 and in the advancement of the negotiation process 
between the European Union and the Republic of Montenegro, which is currently 
in its middle, as well as the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina now has a real chance 
in 2017 to get a candidate status for membership in the European Union.
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